The Institute for International Affairs
Gerry Weinstein President	Frank Dimant Chief Executive Officer	Ruth Klein National Director of Advocacy
Indictment Of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad For Incitement To Genocide Against The Jewish People

Prepared by David Matas, Senior Legal Counsel, B’nai Brith Canada

The prosecution has reasonable and probable grounds to believe that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, President of Iran, has committed the crime of incitement to genocide against the Jewish people.

I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

 

1. Incitement to genocide does not require the existence of genocide in order for the crime of incitement to be committed.

2. Incitement to genocide does not require any particular verbal formulation. The legal definition of genocide does not have to be repeated in the impugned speech for incitement to genocide to occur. For the crime of inciting genocide to be committed, the words used need not be the same as the words used to incite past genocides.

3. It is sufficient to establish that the crime of incitement to genocide was committed to show that the speaker intended to incite genocide, without the need of show that a desire or willingness in any potential audience to participate in genocide is the likely result. Similarly, it is sufficient to establish that the crime of incitement to genocide was committed to show that a desire or willingness in any potential audience to participate in genocide is the likely result without the need to show that the speaker intended to incite genocide.

4. Provided that the likely result, the reasonably foreseeable consequence of the speech, is that any potential audience is moved to participate in genocide, the requisite mental element is only that the person intended the speech. Furthermore, there is a legal presumption that a person's mind goes with his or her speech.

5. Where the test is reasonably foreseeable consequence, the focus is on any potential audience for the speech. Reasonably foreseeable consequence does not mean that the reasonable person would want, as a result of the speech, to commit genocide. Rather, it means that any potential audience, no matter how ill informed or unreasonable, would likely be moved to take part in genocide.

6. For the crime of incitement to genocide to be committed, there is no need to establish that genocide is the likely result. It is sufficient to establish either that the speaker intended genocide or that a desire or willingness in the target audience to participate in genocide is the likely result.

7. For the crime of inciting genocide to be committed, it is not necessary to show that the impugned expression actually caused others to want to inflict genocide. It is sufficient to show only a likelihood of impact, that the impugned speech was likely to lead any potential audience to want to inflict genocide or to accept complicity in the infliction of genocide.